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When the discipline of history came to be formalized and institutionalized in nineteenth 
century Europe, it was assumed that historiography was superior to, and would displace, 
the many modes by which peoples in different times and places had re-presented their 
pasts to themselves. Historiography would displace these forms of remembering and 
representing the past because it had an epistemological warrant that they did not. The 
assumed epistemological superiority of historiography rested, for the most part, upon a 
series of oppositions between fact and fancy, between evidence, and hearsay and 
superstition, and between objectivity, and bias. The modern historical enterprise thus 
presumed that an object called ‘history’ exists, and because it does, that it can be 
objectively represented, and assumed that ‘real’ history-writing is qualitatively different 
from epic, legend and myth.  
I start this essay from the premise that it is not the case that history simply ‘is’, and 
historiography is the best way of representing the past. It is not that history simply 
happens, and historiography is the attempt to recreate that happening through a rigorous 
method. Rather, historiography is an intellectual and cultural construct, one particular 
way of construing and constructing the past; at once a tradition of reasoning, a way of 
being, and a certain practice of subjectivity. The desire to write history is specific to 
certain people (societies, classes) and not others. It is connected to some phenomena- the 
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emergence of the modern state, ‘progress’, scientific rationality- and not others, which it 
usually defines itself against (magic, gods).  And I will conclude this essay by suggesting 
that this way of construing and re-presenting the past is not always adequate to non-
Western pasts. 
The Code of History 
It has often been pointed out that history is unusual in that the term for the discipline 
simultaneously designates its object. Underlying this happy coincidence- as has also been 
pointed out- is an epistemological naivite, one according to which history, unlike other 
disciplines, has no need to think its object, because its object simply is. History-as-fat 
simply happens, and and history-as-discipline is an attempt to recreate that happening to 
the degree that documents allow us to do so. The result, as Louis Althusser pointed out 
long ago1, is that the discipline of history takes methodology for its theory, and 
historiographical debates are more often than not debates over the ‘craft’ of history. But 
this naivite cannot obscure the fact that history as a discipline is not so innocent of 
preconditions. The past is not forever available to the present, a mute entity waiting for 
the historian to give it voice. History writing is not simply a ‘craft’ that is applied to a 
preexistent, natural object, but rather, like any discipline, it conceives and constructs its 
object. 
If history-writing constitutes its object, then how does it constitute that object? Various 
answers to this can and have been given, including Levi-Strauss’s famous answer that the 
code of history is chronology2, and the claim made by others that historiography 
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codes/effects an absolute divide between a dead past and the present.3 Both of these are 
important and defining features of the code of history, but more important still, and above 
all else, historiography encodes the humanism or anthropology that become a defining 
feature of Western thought from the early modern period. It does so, first of all, inasmuch 
as its subject is Man. This seems unremarkable - who else could the object of history be, 
if not Man? Tracing the semantic and epistemic changes underlying the emergence of the 
concept of history, Reinhardt Koselleck however notes that prior to the Enlightenment 
“there was no history for which humanity might have been the subject”4, but rather 
histories in the plural, of specific institutions and communities. The emergence of 
historiography thus corresponds to the emergence of a ‘collective singular’- Man- as the 
object of history.  
That historiography emerges as the study of the past of Man also means that nature no 
longer has a history. Voltaire’s essay on ‘Historie’ in the Encyclopaedia, for example, 
declares that ‘natural history’ is in fact a part of physics, not history. More generally, 
‘historia naturalis’ ceased to belong to the domain of history.5 Gods are also expelled 
from the domain of history. This is not a function of secularisation,  for historiography 
can coexist with religion, and indeed even, as in Ranke’s case, with the conviction that a 
divine Providence animates history. But God or gods can no longer be historical actors, 
because the subject of history is man, and only man. It is this anthropological/humanist 
presumption that disqualifies many of the other forms by which peoples have conceived 
and narrated their past - these are now declared to not be history-writing at all, and indeed 
the emergent discipline defines itself against them. It also means that not only is God not 
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an historical actor, he is himself to be explained, as a creature of men. 
This last is one of the more dramatic implications of an epistemic and cultural shift 
which, amongst its other effects, saw the ways by which European men and women 
recounted and related to their past replaced by this new ‘code’. “The task of the modern 
era”, wrote Ludwig Feuerbach, is “the humanization of God- the transformation and 
dissolution of theology into anthropology.”6 The modern era has been steadily 
discharging that task. Once, to understand men you had to understand God; now, to 
understand the gods of men you have to understand the men, for their gods are the 
fantastical creation of their minds. Once the purposes and the acts of gods explained the 
world of men; now, gods are themselves signs of men, traces from which historians, 
anthropologists and sociologists can recreate the meanings and purposes with which these 
men endowed their world. It is not, then, only that the subject of history is Man, but that 
this subject is a Subject, that is, a meaning and purpose endowing being who objectifies 
himself in the world, and through whose objectifications we can recreate what sort of 
men these were, and what sort of world they had created and inhabited.  
To be sure, there are important differences in how this is formulated. In some cases, the 
signs which give us information about their makers are understood as ‘objective spirit’; in 
others, collectively they constitute a ‘culture’; in others still, these are the signs which 
make up the social text. In some versions the fact that men are authors means that their 
productions are more or less transparent to them, or will become so once Man produces 
the conditions of his life and his own nature under conditions of freedom; for others, we 
are the products of our own productions, but these operate in ways which are opaque to 
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us and partly beyond our control and determination. Different disciplines constituted on 
the basis of these founding presumptions also operationalize or mobilize them in different 
ways. In the case of historiography, the specific form in which anthropological 
assumptions are encoded can be clearly seen in the fetishistic concern with the primary 
source, the text or text analogue which, after Ranke, was seen to define historiography as 
it came to be institutionalised as a discipline. Attention to primary sources is the essence 
of historiography not principally because this is more ‘rigorous’ than earlier methods, but 
because the idea has become naturalized that these are remnants that objectify the 
meanings and purposes of historical actors, from which we can piece together the past.  
Thus Marc Bloch wrote that “it is men that history seeks to grasp”7, and that it achieved 
this through “a knowledge of their tracks. Whether it is the bones immured in the Syrian 
fortifications, a word or form whose use reveals a custom, a narrative written by the 
witness of some scene…what do we really mean by document, if it is not a ‘track’…”8 
For documents to exist as such it is precisely necessary that they be seen as ‘survivals’, as 
‘tracks’, as ‘traces’. Only when we see the score of a Beethoven symphony as something 
surviving from the past, that might be mined for information about music, court culture, 
and many other things beside- rather than as wrapping paper- does it become a document. 
That is precisely why even documents which are of dubious value for the direct 
information which they contain- forgeries are an extreme instance- are nonetheless of 
historical value, for they can, as traces, be made to yield other sorts of information.9 
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A ‘Transcendental Presupposition’ 
Historiography thus ‘encodes’ anthropological presumptions with specific reference to 
the object it constructs and of which it purports to offer knowledge, namely the past. 
Historiography is by no means the only site where this epistemic and cultural 
transformation, one which marks the birth of modern, Western knowledge and culture, 
came to be effected. The transformation in question is very much wider. One after 
another, modern writers of diverse philosophical affiliations, working from within 
different disciplines- Vico, Herder, Tylor, Cassirer, Geertz,  Dilthey, Greenblatt and the 
‘New Historicism’, and numerous others- testify that behind most things lurks Man; that 
art and literature, religion and morality and myth, law and custom,  and common sense 
are all ‘products’, ‘expressions’ or ‘traces’ of ‘societies’ or ‘peoples’ or ‘cultures’. I have 
designated this shift, in shorthand form, as anthropology/humanism. As observed, what 
precise form these presumptions take varies, across authors and also according to 
discipline. The differences are important, but underlying them is a more basic 
commonality, a shared epistemological space. Max Weber characterized it thus:   
The transcendental presupposition of every cultural science…is that we 
are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a 
deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance.10  
I cite Weber not only because ‘transcendental presupposition’ is a particularly apt 
formulation, but also because Weber recognizes that the adoption of this presupposition 
marks a cultural and epistemic transformation, a shift from seeing the world as a text, 
 7 
imbued with meaning and purpose, which men, as creatures made in god’s image and 
endowed with grace and reason, are privileged readers, to the view of the world as a 
social text of which men are the authors. In Weber’s account this presupposition arises 
with the ‘disenchantment of the world’, where modern men and women in the Occident 
recognize that they are cultural beings who endow the world with significance precisely 
because, and in proportion to, the fact that they are forced to recognize that there are no 
meanings already in the world, waiting to be ‘discovered’: “The fate of an epoch which 
has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning 
of the world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a 
position to create this meaning itself.”11 This has not always been presumed, and thus this 
disenchanted outlook has a history, consisting in the specific form that rationalization 
took in Occidental religions, culminating in Protestantism and the social and scientific 
developments with which it was associated. 
But if the realization that we endow meaning upon the world has a history, in what sense 
is this a transcendental presupposition? That is, if it is borne of the specific history of the 
modern West, how can it be said to be a presupposition of universal import?  For 
example, if in the past men and women in Europe saw God as the source of reality and of 
meaning, whereas we disenchanted moderns do not, then by what warrant do we privilege 
our presupposition, and conclude that their God has to be understood and explained as 
meanings they endowed their world with, rather than that which gave them life and the 
world meaning? And by what right to we do so for the non-Western world, which may 
not have undergone the same processes of rationalization, culminating in the 
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disenchantment of the world? 
The answer, according to Weber, is that while we moderns have come to the realization 
that the world is disenchanted as a consequence of a very specific (Occidental) history, 
humans have always been the producers of meanings and purposes, even when they have 
not realized it. David Kolb writes, “In Weber’s eyes, modernity is an explicit recognition 
of what the self and society have been all along. Modern identity is not just another in a 
sequence of historic constructions; it is the unveiling of what has been at the root of these 
constructions.”12 From this perspective, it is enchantment, as intellectual ‘error’, that 
needs ‘explaining’; the disenchantment of the world, while it has a history, is the truth 
finally uncovered. As with other moderns, Weber sees modernity as a privileged vantage 
point that finally makes comprehensible all the history that preceded it. 
Weber’s analysis of disenchantment is deeply indebted to Nietzsche. When Nietzsche has 
a madman announce the death of god, and when he announces the advent of nihilism and 
the destruction of values, he too is announcing that belief in a transcendent realm of 
values, in God, in Platonism, is nearing its end. At times he sounds like an upbeat Weber, 
one who welcomes and celebrates this development, because it allows man to recognize 
as his that which he once attributed to others:  “All the beauty and sublimity we have 
bestowed upon real and imaginary things I will reclaim as the property and product of 
man; as his fairest apology.  Man as poet, as thinker, as God, as love, as power; O, with 
what regal liberality he has lavished gifts upon things, only to impoverish himself and 
make himself feel wretched! His most unselfish act hitherto was to admire and worship 
and to know how to conceal from himself that it was he who created all that he 
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admired.”13 The transcendent values men have subordinated themselves to have in fact 
always been their own products; every discovery was in fact an invention, every 
interpretation a new creation. Nietzsche thinks a recognition of this fact affords the 
possibility of a freedom to revalue all values, recognizing them all as human creations, 
borne of a will to power.  But there is an important difference between Nietzsche and 
Weber, and it does not simply lie in the fact that Nietzsche views with gaiety and 
lightness what Weber announces with foreboding. The Genealogy of Morals and other 
writings provide also a genealogy of the subject, not as a natural being whose essence is 
to be possessed of consciousness and the capacity to create meaning, but as someone 
created to be able to make promises, to feel guilt, to subscribe to values, and the like. 
Thus for Nietzsche- albeit inconsistently so- the subject is not the source and origin of 
meaning and value, but is himself a historical product, forged on the anvil of Christian 
morality and Roman law. Weber assumes that the value creating or culture secreting 
individual has always existed, but only becomes aware of himself as such in modern 
times, whereas for Nietzsche this individual is himself a creation or invention. The 
difference is significant, because if the presumption that humans are the source of all 
values and meanings is in fact historically and culturally produced, then we may not be 
entitled to presuppose it where such a subject has not been created. 
This is Heidegger’s position. Heidegger rejects all talk of Weltanschauung and of 
different ways of ‘picturing’ the world precisely because it assumes that men have always 
pictured the world and ascribed value to it. The difference between the medieval and 
modern worlds is not, however, that modern men and women picture the world 
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differently and have different values. To see the world as picture, to have values and 
cultures and experiences, are not transcendental presuppositions which have finally come 
into their own, but are rather a consequence of cultural and epistemic shifts, including the 
rise of a metaphysics of subjectivity that Heidegger labels ‘anthropology’:  
That the world becomes picture is one and the same event with the 
event of man’s becoming subiectum…the more extensively and the 
more effectively the world stands at man’s disposal as conquered, and 
the more objectively the object appears, all the more 
subjectively...does the subiectum rise up, and all the more 
impetuously, too, do observation and teaching about the world change 
into a doctrine of man, into anthropology. It is no wonder that 
humanism first arises where the world becomes picture...Humanism, 
therefore, in the more strict historiographical sense, is nothing but a 
moral aesthetic anthropology. The name ‘anthropology’ as used 
here...designates that philosophical interpretation of man which 
explains and evaluates whatever is, in its entirety, from the standpoint 
of man and in relation to man.14 
The contemporary anti-humanists who are the heirs of Nietzsche and Heidegger similarly 
insist that Man, far from always having been a value-creating and meaning-producing 
being who with modernity finally becomes aware of that fact, is himself a historically 
produced, and possibly transient, consequence of contingent historical events. One effect 
of such analyses is that historiography is immediately rendered problematic: if Man is a 
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product of history, he cannot be the constant whose changes and transformations it retells. 
Indeed, analyses of this sort reverse our normal sequence of cause and effect, suggesting 
that it is not because Man is the origin and source of meaning and values that he is the 
subject of anthropology and history, but rather that it is this presupposition and its 
correlates, embedded in our culture and our thought, that serve to create and secure 
humanism and anthropology. Historiography is one of the important means by which, and 
sites upon which, this is achieved. “Making historical analysis the discourse of the 
continuous and making human consciousness the original subject of all historical 
development and all action”, according to Michel Foucault, “are two sides of the same 
system of thought,” one characterized by “the sovereignty of the subject and the twin 
figures of anthropology and humanism.”15 Indeed, history-writing has an especially 
important function to fulfil, for as this humanism and anthropology have come to be 
assailed in the study of language, myth, sexuality and kinship, historiography becomes 
“the last resting-place of anthropological thought”16, or in Levi-Strauss’s words, “the last 
refuge of a transcendental humanism.”17   
 
Hermeneutics, Historiography, and non-Western Pasts  
If Weber’s transcendental presupposition cannot in fact be presupposed, if it confuses 
cause with effect, then this constitutes a problem for the code of history whenever it is 
applied to an object where the anthropological presumptions of the code are absent. 
Michel de Certeau points out that when historians study religion, they take it as their task 
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to ask what religion tells us about the society from which it sprang. They assume, that is, 
that ‘society’ is the axis of reference that will render religious phenomena intelligible, 
whereas for their subjects religion was (often) what made society intelligible- “The 
religious history of the seventeenth century…implicates a difference between two 
systems of representation, one ‘social’ (so to speak) and the other ‘religious’; that is, 
between two periods of consciousness, or between two historical types of intelligibility, 
our and theirs. Thus, we have to wonder what may be the meaning of an enterprise that 
consists of ‘understanding’ a time organized as a function of a standard of comprehension 
other than ours.” For “In this [our] perspective, ‘comprehending’ religious phenomena is 
tantamount to repeatedly asking something else of them than what they meant to 
say…taking as a representation of the society what, from their point of view, founded that 
society…”18  
The study of a past that is significantly ‘other’ is in this case characterized by a reversal 
which Certeau renders through a metaphor drawn from chess: “Between their time and 
ours, the signifier and the signified have castled. We postulate a coding which inverts that 
of the time we are studying.”19 As a modern, rational practice, historiography cannot 
accord God the role of a historical actor, and thus we translate seventeenth century 
understandings into our terms. Far from being defined by its avoidance of ‘anachronism’, 
history-writing as discipline and practice is in fact based upon anachronism, continually 
translating the understandings of historical subjects into our modern, anthropological 
understanding. But the converse is also true; our historical practice is not an ex nihilo 
creation, but arises out of previous debates – “when they refer to their own 
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practices…historians discover constraints originating well before their own present, 
dating back to former organizations of which their work is a symptom, not a cause.”20 
‘Our’ historical discourse is a product of those debates and processes which, beginning 
four centuries and more ago, rendered religion into a phenomenon susceptible to 
sociological explanation, rather than regarding the human world as one to be understood 
in terms of Divine instigation. “Just as the ‘model’ of religious sociology implies, among 
other things, the new status of practice or of knowledge in the seventeenth century, so do 
current methods- erased as events and transformed into codes or problematic areas of 
research- bear evidence of former structurings and forgotten histories. Thus founded on 
the rupture between a past that is its object, and a present that is the place of its practice, 
history endlessly finds the present in its object and the past in its practice.”21 
Hans-Georg Gadamer has argued that all encounters with past texts and text-analogues 
are intrinsically interpretive, and that all interpretation in the human sciences is 
intrinsically historical. All encounters with the past occur within a tradition, and if 
history-writing is practiced in a hermeneutical rather than positivist and objectifying way, 
it can lead to greater self-consciousness of that tradition. If we translate Certeau’s 
observations into Gadamerian  terms- recognizing that  to do so is not to stay with 
Certeau’s thought - we could say the following: When we encounter a text from, say, 
seventeenth century Europe, one which explains society and its functioning in terms of 
God, the distance between the text and our historical situation cannot be bridged by 
cancelling one of the terms. Understanding is achieved neither by imposing our current 
understandings upon the text (for example, by treating God as a ‘projection’ and/or as 
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ideology), nor can we seek, as romantic hermeneutics would, to recreate the context and 
meaning of that text in order to restore to it its original meaning and intention.  An 
acknowledgement of the historicity of our own understanding means that we cannot 
accord our categories of interpretation any privilege; but the same acknowledgement of 
the historicity of our understanding means there is no way of encountering the text ‘in its 
own right’. Because this is something more than an epistemological dilemma, it is 
capable of ‘resolution’. The text is not just an object of the past belonging purely to the 
present, for it comes to us already interpreted, not as a mere object, but as a tissue of 
interpretations.  We must remain open to its ‘truth’, and if we become convinced of this, 
it forces us to rethink our current understandings, and to redescribe the tradition through 
which it arrives to us. However if, as is more likely in this case, we find ourselves unable 
to reach an agreement with the text- if there can be no fusion of horizons- we are then 
entitled to try and situate it in terms of its context. But even here, the end-point is not the 
same as it would be had we dismissed the truth of the text from the beginning, for we 
have re-encountered and have arrived at a better understanding of our relation to a 
tradition in which God once bestrode the world and made it in his image, but which later 
gave way to a ‘secular’ view in which God had his historical agency withdrawn from 
him. The ‘former structurings and forgotten histories’ which have brought us to our 
present historical situation are no longer ‘forgotten’; they have been disinterred and re-
examined, and we have arrived at a better understanding of the tradition through which 
we speak, as a result of this encounter.  History “finds the present in its object and the 
past in its practice” self-consciously, as result of such a dialogic encounter, even where, 
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as in this instance, we cannot acknowledge the truth of the text nor achieve a fusion of 
horizons. 
<space> 
I am enquiring into what it means, using the code of history, to write about those who do 
not live by that code or recognize themselves in it. I have argued that this question arises 
not only with reference to the non-Western world, but also with reference to pre-modern 
Europe. To explain the world of men and women of medieval times historically is to 
translate their understandings into our terms, or to repeat Certeau’s words, is to “postulate 
a coding which inverts that of the time we are studying.” However this exercise, while 
anachronistic, is nonetheless productive; even where we cannot accept the ‘truth’ of texts 
from the past, we gain better self-understanding, that is, understanding of the tradition out 
of which we reason.  
The same is not true when we apply the code of history to non-western pasts, for the 
simple reason that the object of enquiry does not belong to the same tradition as the 
enquiring subject.22 To write a history of, say, India from within Western knowledge is to 
confront the fact that the ‘now’ from which we write is not itself linked in a thousand 
ways to the ‘then’ of those of whom we write, because a profound caesura separates the 
two; the tradition from which we write is not the same as that of which we write. Thus 
what might serve to validate the anachronism which is an inescapable feature of 
historiography even when it encounters European pasts is not true here, because in this 
case history “finds the present in its object,” but it does not find an Indian “past in its 
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practice”.  
The knowledge from which we write a history of India is not continuous with the 
knowledges and intellectual traditions of India. These intellectual traditions had not died 
of inanition when the British first came to India; as late as the seventeenth century there 
was an explosion of scholarly writing in Sanskrit, testifying to the vitality of an 
extraordinarily long and continuous intellectual tradition. Some of the navya or new 
scholars of that time self-consciously saw themselves as effecting innovations; but they 
were still heirs to a tradition going back two millennia, which they actively engaged, 
disputed with and developed.  The same in not true of historiography, for neither the 
Sanskrit tradition(s), nor any other indigenous tradition, found an echo in the code of 
history by which we write of Indian pasts. This code was an imposition; it did not engage 
with Indian traditions, did not refute them and thereby displace them. Its victory was won 
cheaply, through administrative fiat, when in 1835 India’s British rulers decided that only 
that education which sought to disseminate modern, Western knowledge through modern 
institutions and pedagogic processes was to receive Government patronage; and that the 
teaching of modern history was to replace the indigenous Puranic ‘histories’ which 
Thomas Babington Macaulay characterized and dismissed as “abounding with kings 
thirty feet high and reigns thirty thousand years long, and geography made of seas of 
treacle and seas of butter.”23 
As a result, the code of history cannot even fulfil the hermeneutic function that it fills 
elsewhere, that of being one of the modes by which men and women of the West can, 
through the self-consciously anachronistic exercise of translating the lives and worlds of 
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their dead forebears into their own terms, illuminate both what connects and separates 
them from this past and these forebears. In India that role continued to be performed by 
the genealogist, the balladeer, and the story-teller, who interpreted and refurbished the 
tradition to which they belonged, by retelling the past.24 The historian, however, was 
closer to the position of the colonial official (many of whom, like James Mill and 
Macaulay, were also historians); she was discontinuous with, and in a position of pure 
externality to, the pasts of which she wrote.  
 
Conclusion 
In this essay I have suggested that anthropology/humanism has fostered an illusion, 
mistaking effect for cause; that it is not because there is Man that the sciences of Man 
have arisen, but that it is the latter that encode, and thus serve to produce and secure, 
humanism.  In characterizing modern thought as anthropological, Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Foucault and other writers I have drawn upon to develop my argument also offer a 
critique of this anthropological presumption. For instance, they argue that the subject is 
neither sovereign nor transparent to himself; that just as he is an effect of certain events, 
he may one day disappear. I am sympathetic to these arguments, but here I have invoked 
them for their characterization, rather than for their critique. I suggest that the assumption 
that Man is a creator of meanings and values is not a “transcendental presupposition” we 
are entitled and even obliged to make, but is rather a form of “transcendental 
narcissism”25, one of the means by which the modern West creates and secures the 
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anthropological /humanist theme that Man is the source and origin of meaning and value 
– and hence the subject of history. Nonetheless, inasmuch as this humanism is in fact 
secured, inasmuch as the West is dominated by a metaphysics of subjectivity, inasmuch 
as the presupposition that Man is source and origin of meaning, value and purpose is 
found in a wide range of practices and institutions and intellectual activities, then a 
historiography founded upon similar premises is an appropriate way for such societies to 
conceive of their past and represent it to themselves. 
Whether such premises are also valid for writing histories of non-western cultures, will 
depend upon whether such presuppositions found a home there. That is, it will depend 
upon whether the ‘transcendental narcissism’ of the West succeeded in also becoming a 
narcissism in the East; whether this ‘white mythology’, as Derrida terms it26, also became 
part of the mythos of the non-white world. In the book from which this paper draws,27 I 
have argued that this has only partially occurred, and thus that post-Enlightenment 
historiography may not be adequate to the task of representing Indian pasts. 
I suggest in this book as I do here that the code of history is but one way of representing 
the past, and a recent one. It is eminently useful even where anachronistic, for when 
written in a hermeneutic mode, it can be a way of engaging, better understanding, and 
developing and refurbishing the intellectual tradition(s) to which we belong, and out of 
which we reason. But this is only true where the code of history is applied to the pasts out 
of which this code itself developed; applied to other pasts, it is neither the ‘right’ way of 
recounting these pasts, nor does it illuminate the traditions of the peoples whose pasts 
these are.  
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Traditions are not hermetically sealed of course. The civilization of medieval and early 
modern India was itself a palimpsest, born of the meeting of the culture, knowledges and 
institutions to which the subcontinent had been home, and those the Turk and Afghan and 
Persian invaders brought with them. If we are willing to allow for the existence of a 
‘Western tradition’ stretching back to a time long before there was any conception of 
‘Europe’ or the West, this was a tradition that includes the collapse of Rome and the 
fusion of Roman law with barbarian institutions, the later revival of Greek learning, and 
the synthesis of Aristotelianism and Christianity effected by St. Thomas. Moreover, this 
and the traditions of India never developed in complete isolation from each other; and for 
some four hundred years now the ways of the Western barbarians have been finding a 
home in India. A fusion of traditions may yet occur, and out of this a new tradition may 
yet be founded. However, historiography today cannot assume that this has already 
occurred. For now, to write history in a Western mode with even a modicum of self-
consciousness is to be continually reminded not only that one is writing from a historical 
now which is very different from that of the object of study, but also that this difference 
is not the space of a dialogue where we simultaneously refurbish and reconsider the 
tradition within which we are located, but that it marks a profound break, the full 
implications of which historiography has yet to register, let alone begin to seriously 
consider.
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